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by Andrew C. Helman
PUTTING EQUITY BACK IN REVERSE MORTGAGES
Policymakers can help some seniors age in place 
through policies to strengthen private-sector reverse 
mortgages. In reverse mortgages, individuals who 
may be “house rich but cash poor” can use their 
home’s equity to receive regular income or get 
money through a credit line. Andrew Helman 
argues that state legislatures can help seniors avoid 
the “tricks and traps” of reverse mortgages by estab-
lishing programs in which lenders who agree to 
play by rules that ensure the safety and security of 
such mortgages are placed on a “preferred” list for 
seniors seeking a loan. He observes that laying the 
groundwork now can help a larger group of seniors 
age with dignity.    
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 We should provide for our age, in order that 
our age may have no urgent wants of this 
world to abstract it from the meditations of 
the next. It is awful to see the lean hands of 
Dotage making a coffer of the grave! 
     —Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton (Bulwer 2006)
INTRODUCTION
As the great recession continues to linger, financial pressures are putting the squeeze on Maine seniors 
for basic needs such as gas, groceries, and medical 
expenses (Morin and Taylor 2009). And retirement  
for baby boomers is right around the corner, even as 
their parents’ wealth evaporates. Given these realities, 
Maine, like many other states, is at a crossroads: How 
do policymakers ensure seniors retire with dignity in  
spite of a down economy, evaporating wealth, and 
diminished resources for social welfare programs?
Given emerging data showing that the vast 
majority of seniors would prefer to age in place (Bayer 
and Harper 2009), one option some seniors will likely 
consider is a reverse mortgage. Reverse mortgages are 
rising debt/falling equity mortgages through which 
seniors can turn the equity in their homes into a stream 
of cash or credit line. In light of recent reports of fraud 
and abuse with reverse-mortgage transactions, however, 
significant reforms are needed to make reverse mort-
gages safe and secure for seniors.
This essay will discuss tricks and traps1 plaguing 
reverse mortgages along with concrete steps that can  
be taken at the state level to remedy the problem for 
Maine seniors. While the private and public sectors  
are both able to help cash-strapped seniors, this essay 
argues that the reverse-mortgage market presents an 
option that is likely to become more popular and, 
therefore, would benefit from consumer-protection 
reforms. The basic premise is that legislators could 
induce private-sector lenders to agree to lend on  
terms that are free from common tricks and traps  
in exchange for placing lenders participating in this 
program on a preferred list that would be maintained 
by the appropriate state agency such as MaineHousing. 
Seniors would benefit from safe and secure loans, while 
lenders would benefit from the imprimatur of state 
government when accessing this 
largely untapped market.
THE SCOPE OF THE 
PROBLEM
Many seniors face a three-fold problem. First, for 
the vast majority of seniors, 
wealth tends to be tied up in  
the equity of their homes 
(Hammond 1993). As a result, 
much of their financial resources 
are in the form of an illiquid 
asset that is often unable to 
produce income—a problem 
compounded by the fact that 
seniors have higher rates of 
homeownership than other age 
groups (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). Yet, at the same 
time, housing costs are seniors’ largest expenditure 
(Loonin and Renuart 2007). Second, according to an 
article in the July 2, 2008, issue of USA Today by 
Lynn O’Shaughnessy, expenses for necessary items such 
as food, fuel, and medicine “have galloped beyond 
reach,” and many seniors are “living on fixed incomes” 
and “just getting crushed on food and medicine that 
they can’t do without.” Third, incomes tend to be lower 
for those over 65 years old, and about 75 percent of all 
seniors have incomes below $33,000 (DeNavas-Walt, 
Proctor and Smith 2009; Purcell 2009). For seniors, 
lower incomes make it especially difficult to keep up 
with rising expenses such as property taxes, which tend 
to increase as property values go up, because seniors’ 
incomes usually do not rise correspondingly (Loonin 
and Renuart 2007). 
Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe  
that we are looking at the tip of the iceberg (Brandon 
2008). On one hand, “the population of seniors will 
increase 35 percent to nearly 55 million by 2020” 
(Salkin 2009: 292). On the other hand, from October 
2007 to October 2008, retirement accounts lost 
between $1.6 and $2 trillion, which will dispropor-
tionately affect baby boomers nearing retirement 
because they have less time to recover their wealth 
(Brandon 2008). 
PUTTING EQUITY BACK IN REVERSE MORTGAGES
…the reverse- 
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presents an option 
that is likely to 
become more 
popular and, there-
fore, would benefit 
from consumer-
protection reforms. 
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have mostly stalled (David Ledew, personal communi-
cation). While the state has recouped virtually all of the 
money invested in the program, it tied up scarce 
resources that could have been directed to other 
programs, and it essentially put the state in the business 
of lending, which the private sector may be better 
equipped to do. 
The details of the program were fairly simple. For 
seniors who met eligibility criteria—at a minimum, 65 
years old and earning less than $32,000 a year—Maine 
state government picked up the municipal property 
taxes, which allowed the senior to defer payment. In 
exchange for accepting the state’s help, seniors agreed to 
repay the amount of money advanced plus interest, 
which was set at six percent per year. Four major classes 
of events triggered a repayment obligation: death of the 
participant; sale of the property; the participant moved 
for reasons other than health; or the property, such as a 
mobile home, was removed from the state. 
The state secured its interest by recording a lien  
on the property. If the state did not recoup its money 
by April 30 of the year after the repayment obligation 
matured, the lien was treated as a mortgage with 
priority above all other encumbrance. While the pro-
gram provided for a non-judicial foreclosure process, the 
state only foreclosed on one property in the program’s 
history (David Ledew, personal communication). 
Despite the program’s modest enrollment—for 
example, 73 participants in year one, 90 in year four, 
and about 175 at the program’s height—the legislature 
quickly became concerned about the growing cost of 
the program (David Ledew, personal communication). 
Thus, the legislature authorized the state tax assessor to 
pay less than the total amount due to municipal taxing 
authorities, which, to many people, signaled a lack  
of confidence in the program (David Ledew, personal 
communication). However, the real death knell came  
a few years later, in the wake of a fiscal crisis that led  
to a shutdown of state government in 1991 (David 
Ledew, personal communication). In 1994, as part of  
a supplemental budget bill, the legislature established  
a retroactive moratorium on new claims under the 
program. There was no floor debate or discussion in  
the press of this issue.
Recently, Rep. Kathleen Chase (R-Wells), 
attempted to breathe new life into the Elderly Tax 
On top of that, according to an article in Baby 
Boomer Magazine (www.babyboomer-magazine.com/
news/119/ARTICLE/1108/2009-02-10.html) many 
boomers can expect smaller inheritances because the 
generation before them is living longer and also has 
been hit hard by the current financial crises. And that 
does not take into consideration that many boomers 
expect retirement to be more active than the preceding 
generation, which means their expenses will likely be 
about 15 percent higher.
Taken together, the problem stands in stark relief. 
The current group of seniors is “sitting on a large 
amount of home equity,” but face trouble making ends 
meet (Loonin and Renuart 2007: 180). The baby 
boomers, who are rapidly approaching retirement,  
are facing diminished retirement savings due to the 
economic downturn and have no substantial hope of 
being bailed out by inheritances from their parents. 
MAINE’S FAILED PUBLIC SECTOR SOLUTION
Policymakers in Maine have tried to help seniors cope with financial stress in the past (L.D. 1088, 
Statement of Fact [114th Legis. 1989]; House Amend. 
H to Comm. Amend. A. to L.D. 1088, No. H-388 
[114th Legis. 1989]; Legis. Rec. 1890 [1989]). In 
1989, the legislature enacted the Elderly Tax Deferral 
Program, which called on state government to pay local 
property taxes for some low-income seniors in exchange 
for liens on the seniors’ homes that were enforceable 
upon transfer of the property or death of the senior.2 
But due to the costs, the program proved to be unsus-
tainable, and for the same reason, efforts to revive it 
Given the relatively high rates of home 
ownership and stagnant or declining 
incomes among seniors, many “face the 
dilemma of being ‘house rich, but cash 
poor’” (Hammond 1993: 76). 
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expenses or any return to principal needed to hedge 
against a further decline in the financial markets. 
Given that seniors have a relatively short time horizon 
for investing, however, their corresponding risk toler-
ance should be low, which rules out stocks and leaves 
as investment options cash, cash equivalents, or 
bonds. Yet, current interest rates are too low to 
generate the levels of income needed from cash, cash 
equivalents, or bonds.
Sale-leaseback transactions present another option, 
but they are often complex to navigate. In a sale-lease-
back, a homeowner sells the house to an investor, often 
a family member, who then leases the home back to the 
senior (Hammond 1993). The senior-seller usually gets 
a down payment from the buyer, followed by monthly 
principal and interest payments, which may be used to 
offset payments due as a tenant (Hammond 1993). 
These are complex transactions that could put seniors 
in risky situations. For example, as tenants, seniors may 
be vulnerable to evictions or unscrupulous and inatten-
tive landlords. Additionally, seniors who finance the 
sale-leasebacks themselves could be forced to take legal 
action if payments are delinquent.
For those seniors with good family relations, 
retaining a life estate or a support mortgage may be 
viable options, though both have the potential to create 
adversarial relationships with family members (Nelson 
and Whitman 1994; Hammond 1993). Retaining a life 
estate entails selling the right to possess and use the 
property upon the senior’s death, while keeping an 
ownership interest for the remainder of the senior’s life. 
This option would almost certainly require legal assis-
tance, thus adding to the transaction costs. A support 
mortgage can be similarly complicated. Under this 
option, a senior would sell his or her home, and the 
buyer would grant a mortgage on the home to the 
senior; if the buyer-mortgagor failed to provide support 
for the senior-mortgagee, then the senior could fore-
close upon the home. Even assuming the best of inten-
tions, a support mortgage sets up a potentially 
adversarial relationship among family members. 
Complicating any analysis is the fact that, 
according to a recent AARP survey, about 84 percent  
of those 55 or older want to age in place and stay in 
their homes if that is possible (Bayer and Harper 
2000). In fact, the data strongly suggest that “the desire 
Deferral Program, but she was unable to win support 
from the legislature’s Taxation Committee because of 
the cost of the program, even though she proposed 
raising the minimum age for participation to 70 (David 
Ledew, personal communication). Rep. Chase’s effort 
was not entirely without success, however. The Taxation 
Committee amended her proposal and voted to allow 
municipalities to establish optional tax-deferral 
programs based on guidelines that are similar to the 
Elderly Tax Deferral Program (Comm. Amend. A. to 
L.D. 1121 [124th Legis. 2010]). But even this modest 
proposal may be a questionable use of public resources. 
It would tie up millions in scarce public resources; it 
could give lenders cold feet and add to borrowing costs; 
and it would likely add to administrative costs for 
enforcement proceedings. 
A PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTION
The Options
Given the relatively high rates of home ownership 
and stagnant or declining incomes among seniors, 
many “face the dilemma of being ‘house rich, but cash 
poor’” (Hammond 1993: 76). The private sector, 
however, provides seniors with different ways to turn 
locked-up equity into cash through sales, sale-lease-
backs, retaining a life estate, a support mortgage,  
or a reverse mortgage (Nelson and Whitman 1994; 
Hammond 1993; Thompson v. Glidden, 445 A.2d 676 
[Me. 1982]). There are distinct advantages and disad-
vantages to each, especially for homeowners in states 
with housing costs similar to Maine, where the median 
sale price for a home in 2008 was $178,000, and the 
average monthly rent for a two bedroom apartment in 
the same year was $846.95.3 
A sale is “the most obvious way for the elderly 
homeowner to convert home equity to an income-
producing use” (Hammond 1993: 79). A homeowner 
can then invest the proceeds to generate income, or 
simply live off of the sale proceeds and buy or rent less 
expensive housing (Hammond 1993). Based on the 
2008 median sale price and monthly rent for Maine,  
a senior would need to realize a return of 5.7 percent 
from investing the proceeds of a sale in order to cover 
rent—and that does not account for investment 
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Reverse Mortgages and the Home Equity 
Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Program
Reverse mortgages function like a mirror image of 
traditional residential home loans. With a traditional 
residential home loan, lenders typically make single, 
lump-sum payments to borrowers at the beginning  
of the loan term, and that money is often used to 
purchase the property against which a mortgage is 
granted (Nelson and Whitman 1994). This traditional 
“forward mortgage,” or rising equity/falling debt, loan 
is based on a borrower’s personal credit-worthiness, 
personal guarantee, and projected income, which is 
used to make payments throughout the life of the loan. 
As the borrower makes payments under the terms of  
a traditional forward loan—excluding, for example, 
interest only loans, where borrowers’ payments only 
cover the interest accruing—the amount of principle 
owed will slowly decline, and the homeowner’s equity 
in the property will increase.
In contrast, reverse mortgages are typically nonre-
course4, 5 loans secured by an elderly person’s primary 
residence, and a balloon payment typically is not 
required until a specified event occurs such as transfer, 
death, or the senior moves out of the home perma-
nently. Unlike traditional forward financing with 
regular, even monthly payments made by the borrower 
to the lender, reverse-mortgage lenders may make 
regular monthly payments to the borrower that increase 
the amount owed to the lender and are secured by the 
collateralized property (Nelson and Whitman 1994). 
To be eligible for insurance under the HECM program, 
however, a mortgage loan must allow for payment 
based on a line of credit, for a term set by the senior, 
for the tenure of the senior’s ownership, or a mix of 
monthly payments and a credit line. Additionally, the 
lenders must allow the borrower to convert the method 
of payment during the term of the mortgage. 
Three ingredients helped to make reverse mort-
gages more popular and accessible. First, in 1998, 
Congress made the Federal Housing Authority’s (FHA) 
HECM program permanent (Nelson 2009). Second, 
“Fannie Mae established a secondary market for home 
equity conversion mortgages, which by increasing 
liquidity, helped increase the number of lenders willing 
to provide home equity conversion mortgages” (Nelson 
to remain in their current residence for as long as 
possible” is “more prevalent as age increases” (Bayer and 
Harper 2000: 25). About 82 percent of survey respon-
dents would prefer to have help given to them in their 
current home, if it eventually becomes necessary, as 
opposed to moving to a skilled nursing facility or 
moving to a friend’s or relative’s home (Bayer and 
Harper 2000). Moreover, of the roughly 30 percent  
of survey respondents who said they do not expect  
to stay at home, 72 percent made no plans for when 
that day arrives—a statistic that seems to have held 
steady over more than a decade of repeated surveys 
(Bayer and Harper 2000). 
For those seniors wishing to stay in their homes, 
reverse mortgages present a viable alternative, in part 
because the government and financial institutions have 
helped to create financial products to fill this niche. 
Broadly speaking, a reverse mortgage is a rising-debt/
falling-equity loan that “allows a homeowner to with-
draw the equity in her home in the form of a loan with 
a balance that increases rather than decreases over time” 
(Nelson 2009: 340). In a typical reverse-mortgage 
transaction, a homeowner can borrow money against 
the equity in his or her home and does not have to 
repay the loan until a triggering event occurs, such as 
selling the home (Nelson 2009). 
Scholars, news reports, and senior advocates, 
however, have drawn attention to serious concerns 
about predatory and abusive lending practices along 
with significant costs associated with reverse mortgages 
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009; Nelson 2009). According 
to an article by Tara Siegel Bernard in the April 16, 
2010, issue of The New York Times, some of the 
concerns focus on the cost of origination fees, the cost 
of insurance premiums designed to protect the lender  
if the home value declines, and the impact on inter-
generational wealth transfer. 
With prodding from state policymakers, however, 
reverse mortgages have the potential to be useful finan-
cial products that could help some seniors age in place. 
The key is eliminating tricks and traps, so that seniors 
and senior advocates can evaluate the financial costs 
associated with reverse mortgages and make informed 
decisions as to whether a reverse mortgage makes good 
financial sense in any given situation.
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FHA, concerns about fraud by individuals and preda-
tory practices within the industry, and misleading 
marketing. As a result, leading senior advocacy organi-
zations, such as AARP, have issued strong warnings 
against reverse mortgages. Bluntly put, AARP said:  
“A word of caution to older Americans considering 
reverse mortgages: Tread carefully” (Fleck 2009).
Counseling is an important safeguard to inform 
seniors and help them to steer clear of transactions that 
may not be in their best interest. In June 2009, 
however, The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
cautioned Congress that “HUD’s internal controls do 
not provide reasonable assurance that counseling 
providers are complying with HECM counseling” 
requirements (Scirè 2009). An undercover investigation 
by GAO revealed that nearly half of the counselors 
failed to cover all of the topics required by HUD, such 
as other financial products and options that could be  
a better fit for some seniors, and some counselors 
misstated the length of the counseling sessions in their 
officially filed records (Scirè 2009). 
Fraud and predatory practices continue to be a 
problem in the industry, garnering headlines in news-
papers and cautions from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). For example, according to an 
article by Anne Tergesen in the August 27, 2009, issue 
of The Wall Street Journal, a Florida mortgage broker 
scammed seniors out of about $1 million by diverting 
money that should have gone to repay their conven-
tional forward loans as part of reverse mortgage refi-
nance transactions. Similarly, in a March 2009 bulletin, 
the FBI cautioned that “unscrupulous loan officers, 
mortgage companies, investors, loan counselors, 
appraisers, builders, developers, and real estate agents 
are exploiting Home Equity Conversion Mortgages 
2009: 340). Third, in 2006, the first reverse-mortgage-
backed securities entered the market, with two private 
securitizations (Nelson 2009). Additionally, at the 
beginning of October 2006, Ginnie Mae announced 
that it also intended offer securities backed by 
FHA-approved reverse mortgages (www.ginniemae.gov/
news2006/10-17presshud.asp?Section=Media). 
Today, the bulk of all reverse-mortgage loans—
about 90 percent—are insured by FHA and must meet 
the administration’s standards for participation in the 
HECM program (Nelson 2009; Redfoot, Scholen and 
Brown 2007). FHA’s standards are set by statute and 
rule and include lengthy requirements for borrowers 
and lender-loan originators, otherwise the loans cannot 
be insured by FHA . Under these guidelines, for 
example, the loan originator must be approved by the 
HUD Secretary, and mortgagors or the mortgagor’s 
spouse must be at least 62 years old. Additionally,  
in terms of programmatic substance, a loan is only 
eligible to be insured by FHA if it meets consumer 
protection standards prescribed by statute. For example, 
the senior-mortgagor must receive counseling from  
an independent third party without an interest in  
the transaction along with a disclosure of all costs. 
Moreover, prepayment must be accepted without 
penalty; the loans must be nonrecourse, which means 
homeowners are not personally liable for the difference 
between the amount of indebtedness under the mort-
gage and the amount the mortgagee recovers at the 
time the mortgage is discharged; lenders must allow 
homeowners to select the way they wish to receive their 
distributions, whether in the form of a line of credit, 
on a monthly basis, or on some other basis; and mort-
gagees must allow mortgagors to convert the method of 
payment. Similarly, homeowners must be guaranteed 
payment, even if the lender defaults; lenders must agree 
to adhere to caps on origination fees of $6,000; and 
lenders must put firewalls in place so that loan origina-
tors have no financial incentive to provide other finan-
cial or insurance products. 
Tricks and Traps
In the past few years, the reverse-mortgage 
industry has earned bad press for predatory practices. 
Some of the criticism has centered around poor adher-
ence to pre-borrowing counseling standards set by 
With prodding from state policymakers…
reverse mortgages have the potential  
to be useful finan cial products that  
could help some seniors age in place. 
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home equity conversion products into safe and secure 
borrowing options for seniors, the vast majority of 
whom would prefer to age in their homes (Bayer and 
Harper 2000).
Broadly speaking, state legislatures have an oppor-
tunity to establish programs in which lending institu-
tions that agree to play by newly established rules 
aimed at ensuring reverse-mortgage loans are safe and 
secure could be placed on a list of preferred lenders 
provided to seniors seeking a loan. Those rules could 
require, for example, strong consumer protection stan-
dards, a ban on yield spread premiums, a suitability 
analysis, a “lite” product geared toward property taxes, 
prohibitions on inappropriate cross-selling of annuities 
and other financial or insurance products, and a private 
right of action for damages plus attorneys fees for viola-
tions of the program rules. For the vast majority of 
reverse-mortgage loans, these state standards could 
wrap around the basic requirements of FHA’s HECM 
program.
Seniors would benefit from reverse mortgages 
provided by known lenders that agree to make sure 
their products meet these standards. Lenders would 
benefit from the imprimatur of the state government  
or agency administering the program and easy access to 
the expanding market of seniors. States would benefit 
by directing private resources to a problem that has 
beguiled legislators.
Among the many possible directions to go, here 
are a few recommendations that could form the basis  
of a discussion:
1. Require participating lenders to meet tough 
consumer protection standards. Ideally, 
HECM program standards could serve as a 
starting point to this discussion, especially 
because about 90 percent of the reverse-mort-
gage market already adheres to FHA’s stan-
dards in order to benefit from insured loans. 
There would be several advantages to using 
HECM’s standards as a starting point. First, 
consumers would be guaranteed that FHA will 
step in to provide performance if the lender 
defaults, and the lender would have a guar-
antee of a minimum return on its investment, 
in case real estate prices drop. Second, while 
GAO certainly raised valid concerns about 
(HECMs) . . . to defraud senior citizens” (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2009: 1). Scholars and 
consumer advocates believe the problem extends 
beyond a few bad apples (Nelson 2009; Twomey and 
Jurgens 2009). With the economic downturn, “[s]ome 
lenders view reverse mortgages as a replacement for 
subprime lending as a new way to generate revenue” 
(Nelson 2009: 360). In fact, “[m]any of the same 
players that fueled the subprime mortgage boom— 
ultimately with disastrous consequences—have turned 
their attention to the reverse market” (Twomey and 
Jurgens 2009: 1). Considering that the penetration of 
reverse mortgages as a product is about one percent of 
its potential market, lenders “forecast tremendous 
growth due to the 10,000 baby-boomers turning sixty-
two every day” (Nelson 2009: 360-361).
Furthermore, misleading advertising also plagues 
the industry (Scirè 2009). GAO found that lenders and 
HUD use broad language that can mislead seniors 
about the security of their homes or misrepresent 
reverse mortgages as a government benefit program, 
rather than a private sector lending option (Scirè 2009).
Making Reverse Mortgages Safe and Secure
Despite the concerns discussed above, the reverse-
mortgage market is expected to grow significantly over 
the next decade (Nelson 2009). The anticipated growth 
of this market presents an opportunity to transform 
…state legislatures have an oppor - 
tunity to establish programs in which 
lending institu tions that agree to play  
by newly established rules aimed at 
ensuring reverse-mortgage loans are  
safe and secure could be placed on a  
list of preferred lenders provided to 
seniors seeking a loan. 
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and when problems arise brokers and lenders 
disavow any relationship of trust and confi-
dence with borrowers” (Twomey and Jurgens 
2009: 19).
 Requiring a suitability analysis would address 
some of these issues. A suitability analysis 
would establish “[a] standard of conduct that 
would require brokers and lenders to have 
reasonable grounds for believing that a reverse 
mortgage is suitable for the borrower” 
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009: 19). Consumer 
advocates have argued that it “is necessary to 
counteract market forces that favor profit-
ability over responsible lending” (Twomey  
and Jurgens 2009: 19). Imposing a suitability 
analysis requirement emerged as a significant 
recommendation of the National Consumer 
Law Center and AARP for making the reverse-
mortgage market safe (Twomey and Jurgens 
2009; Redfoot, Scholen and Brown 2007). 
The use of a suitability analysis is well-estab-
lished in securities law, imposing a duty on a 
securities broker only to sell securities that are 
suitable based on the buyer’s financial where-
withal, tax status, overall investment objec-
tives, and other factors (Hirsch 2008). But the 
use of a suitability analysis is only now gaining 
traction in the area of mortgage law due to the 
subprime mortgage meltdown (Hirsch 2008).
3. Require appraisals conducted for reverse 
mortgages to be truly independent. To avoid 
inflated values and abuse of the borrowing-
lending process, it would be wise to require 
truly independent value appraisals for loans 
originated through this program. Doing so 
would remove another recently emerging area 
of fraud in the reverse-mortgage market: 
instances where speculators buy properties at 
low prices and, using inflated appraisals, sell 
them to seniors willing to take out a reverse 
mortgage as part of the transaction.
 A cost-effective way to tackle this issue would 
be to have the agency administering this 
program maintain a list of appraisers. During 
HUD’s counseling requirement, the existence 
of the requirement benefits consumers and 
adherence can be improved through separate 
state standards or inducements. For example, 
the legislature could demonstrate how seri-
ously it takes strict adherence to this require-
ment by suspending any lender making loans 
despite knowing that counseling was insuffi-
cient for a particular loan. This could be 
ensured by requiring loan originators to ask 
targeted questions for data collection about the 
substance of the counseling actually received 
and submit that paperwork to the state over-
sight agency for auditing purposes. Third, the 
program has reasonable caps on origination 
fees, and the legislature could always tighten 
these standards. Fourth, lenders are subject to 
substantial disclosure requirements, such as 
Truth in Lending.
 However, HECM standards may not be 
appropriate in all instances. For example, 
current program standards limit the maximum 
amount a senior can borrow to $625,000. 
Requiring strict adherence to the program’s 
standards would leave some asset-rich seniors 
out in the cold. But this may be a largely illu-
sory problem in states like Maine, where the 
median sale price for a home in 2008 was 
$178,000.
2. Require lenders or broker-originators to 
engage in a suitability analysis for reverse 
mortgages. Arguably, seniors are in need of 
protection in a reverse-mortgage transaction. 
Seniors are considered to be more likely the 
victims of financial fraud or abuse, and the 
complexities of the transactions can be difficult 
to navigate (www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/
seniorsfam.htm). Many brokers and lenders 
are trained to emphasize “the importance of 
building trust with potential customers” 
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009: 19). Because 
reverse mortgages are business deals “where 
each party ostensibly protects his or her own 
economic interests, in many states brokers and 
lenders owe no fiduciary duty to borrowers, 
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directing borrowers to other services where 
the broker, lender, or an affiliate would 
gain, directly or indirectly, in conjunction 
with a reverse-mortgage transaction. Mostly, 
this is a belt-and-suspenders approach to 
piggy-back on recent changes to the HECM 
program. A state legislature, however, could 
expand the prohibition so that lenders, 
brokers, or their affiliates would be banned 
from directing borrowers to contractors or 
purveyors of other services, if the lender, 
broker, or an affiliate would gain financially. 
At its core, the motivating principle is that 
brokers and lenders should not gain from a 
transaction in which they help seniors tap into 
the equity of their homes only to redirect it 
back to themselves or an affiliate. 
7. Require adherence to advertising regula-
tions aimed at eliminating misleading 
advertising. As mentioned above, GAO iden-
tified six commonly appearing misleading 
claims in reverse-mortgage advertising mate-
rials. Lenders participating in this program 
should forgo all misleading advertising and 
claims, or lose their status as a preferred lender. 
To help with enforcement of this requirement, 
the agency administering the program could 
be authorized to deal with complaints of 
misleading advertising administratively, subject 
of course to judicial review.
8. Lenders that are the subject of repeated 
substantiated complaints resulting in find-
ings of program violations or other evidence 
impugning trustworthiness lose their 
preferred status. This suggestion is aimed at 
providing recourse against a lender that flouts 
program regulations either as a matter of 
policy or as a result of a few bad apples. The 
carrot extended to lenders is participation as  
a preferred lender. If lenders fail to adhere to 
the program’s guidelines, they should lose the 
benefit of that status. 
the application process, the lender or 
borrower could call the agency, which could 
then dispatch an appraiser directly to the 
property. The basic idea is to remove control 
in selecting appraisers from lenders. While 
appraisers are typically paid by and work for 
borrowers, as a de facto matter, lenders and 
broker-originators often set up the appraisal, 
which leads to an informal business incentive 
to keep the lender happy.
4. Ban bonus payments to brokers for steering 
seniors to loans with interest rates higher 
than they could obtain. Yield-spread 
premiums are payments from lenders to 
brokers “in exchange for the broker selling  
the borrower a loan with a higher interest  
rate than the borrower could have received” 
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009: 19). As it 
currently stands, neither HUD nor Congress 
have banned yield-spread premiums in the 
HECM program. Simply put, yield-spread 
premiums should be prohibited because they 
are an unscrupulous practice, especially in a 
market made up of seniors.
5. Create a “lite” reverse-mortgage product 
specifically geared toward property taxes. 
This suggestion would target one of the 
chronic complaints of many homeowners—
that property taxes are too high for seniors  
to remain in their homes. A limited or “lite” 
product could be created with a streamlined 
application process, reduced origination fees, 
and an explicit requirement for quick and easy 
pay-off. Doing so would help seniors get 
targeted relief for property taxes, which could 
be made even more effective if lenders offer  
to escrow property taxes for borrowers. This 
suggestion would build on one of the key 
recommendations of AARP (Redfoot, Scholen 
and Brown 2007).
6. Prohibit the sale of annuities, insurance, or 
other similar financial products; prohibit 
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the Elderly Tax Deferral Program, but it lacked staying 
power, in part because it tied up significant resources. 
And recent efforts aimed at reviving the program—
even with a higher minimum age for eligibility—
demonstrate that policymakers are less than excited 
about the prospect of committing substantial public 
resources to this problem.
That leaves the private sector, and state legislatures 
have a unique opportunity to help shape market forces 
so that seniors are offered a safe and secure financial 
product. Given the overwhelming desire of most 
seniors to remain in their homes, one way to guide the 
market would be for state legislatures to offer to place 
reverse-mortgage lenders on a preferred list if the 
lenders agree to play by rules designed to ensure fair 
transactions for seniors. Those rules could include, for 
example, tough consumer-protection standards, a ban 
on yield-spread premiums, a suitability analysis, a “lite” 
product geared toward property taxes, prohibitions on 
inappropriate cross-selling of annuities or other finan-
cial products, a private right of action for damages plus 
attorneys fees for violations of the program rules, along 
with the other suggestions discussed in this article.
Whether now or later, state policymakers will be 
faced with the daunting task of planning for the 
support of an aging population. By taking active steps 
now to get in front of the problem before it grows 
further, policymakers will be laying the groundwork for 
a larger group of seniors to age with dignity.  
9. Provide the appropriate agencies with 
enforcement power as well as authorize  
a private right of action with the lender/
broker paying attorney fees for the borrower 
if they are found to have preyed upon a 
senior. This suggestion is a counter-point to 
(8) and serves as the stick. For consumer 
protection laws to be effective, there must be a 
punishment for action that harms consumers. 
With that in mind, legislatures should consider 
providing the appropriate agencies with 
enforcement powers to seek civil or even crim-
inal penalties if conduct by lenders warrants it. 
Consumers should also be empowered to bring 
actions, with the lender bearing the cost if it 
turns out the lender has violated program rules 
and brought harm to the consumer. For 
example, in Maine, the state’s Unfair Trade 
Practices Act provides a ready legal rubric 
within which these goals could be achieved, 
and it would be worth considering whether 
the most effective approach would be to deem 
violations of the reverse-mortgage program 
violations of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices 
Act, or a similar statute in another state. 
Even if reverse mortgages can be successfully 
reformed to eliminate tricks and abusive practices, 
there are significant limitations to the product in the 
context of a broader analysis for seniors. Seniors, advo-
cates, and those helping seniors through these decisions 
should give serious consideration to all available alter-
natives, especially when there are family members who 
could help to facilitate other alternatives. The New 
York Times article by Bernard provides an example of 
how to analyze whether a reverse mortgage makes sense 




Maine, like many states, is at a crossroads when it comes to policy options to help cash-strapped 
seniors. Maine tried a public sector solution through 
Whether now or later, state policy- 
makers will be faced with the daunting 
task of planning for the support of  
an aging population. 
Please turn the page for notes, references, and author information.
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ENDNOTES
1. “Tricks and traps” is a phrase often used by 
Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Warren to 
refer to murky arrangements and agreements in 
credit card contracts. A transcript of an interview 
with Elizabeth Warren about credit card “tricks and 
traps” is available on the PBS Web site: www.pbs.
org/now/shows/501/credit-traps.html. The term 
seems equally as useful here.
2. Details about the Elderly Tax Deferral Program is 
found in Maine Revised Statutes, Title 36, Chapter  
908: Deferred Collection of Homestead Property 
Taxes, particularly §§ 6250, 6251, 6254, 6255, 6257, 
6259, and 6267. This information is available at 
www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/36/
title36ch908sec0.html.
3. Housing cost information comes from the Maine 
State Planning Office, Maine Economics and 
Demographics Program, which provides access to 
U.S. Census data and allowing users to build 
spreadsheets for particular data sets. Data cited 
comes from the housing data set for 2008. http://
econ.maine.gov/index/sheet.
4. Nonrecourse financing refers to those arrange-
ments where the borrower is not personally liable, 
and in this context means the estate of a deceased 
senior would not be responsible for any amount 
owed under the promissory note.  
5. Specific legal information about reverse mortgages 
can be found in U.S. Code Title 12-Banks and 
Banking, 13-National Housing, Subchapter 
II-Mortgage Insurance §§ 1715z-20: Insurance of 
home equity conversion mortgages for elderly 
homeowners. This information is available at http://
www.techlawreporter.com/toa/codes/usc/titles/
TITLE12/12USC1715z-20.html.
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